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INTRODUCTION

International trade tensions—trade wars, tariffs, trade deficits, and more—
dominated global news in the late-2010s, stoking the imagination of not only
politicians and economists but also the average citizen. This phenomenon was
part of the public reaction to the changing policies on a global level surrounding
international trade and investment relationships. Beginning in the latter-half of
the twentieth century and accelerating after the end of the Cold War, the world’s
states broke down barriers to international trade and investment through multilateral treaty systems such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).1 These multilateral systems
did not regulate, though, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), the transfer of capital
across international borders.2 Instead, the various states individually regulated
FDI through a collection of treaties between usually two states that provided protection for the investments of a citizen of one state in the other.3 These treaties
are known as Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).4
Most BITs offered protection to investors through the abrogation of the Rule
of Local Remedies (the RLR), a doctrine of customary international law that requires international claims be resolved in the host state’s local courts.5 Under
these BITs, investors could file claims against the host state directly before an
international tribunal in an arbitral proceeding known as “Investor-State Dispute
Settlement” (ISDS).6 Since the global financial crisis in 2008, though, political
leaders questioned the viability of such liberalized trade policies.7 Beginning
around 2015, international political leaders renegotiated BITs to be more
1
RALPH H. FOLSON ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 385–
88 (4th ed. 2017).
2
Id. at 721.
3
Id. at 765–70.
4
Id.
5
See generally, Henok Gabisa, The Fate of International Human Rights Norms in the
Realm of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs): Has Humanity Become a Collateral Damage?,
48 THE INT’L LAW. 153 (2014) (explaining the role of BITs as a transformation of transnational
investment and as a legal document protecting investors in a foreign country).
6
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006:
Trends in Investment Rulemaking, 108, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5 (Jan. 31, 2007)
[hereinafter BITs 1995-2006].
7
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance, 24–25, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2015 (Jun. 25,
2015) (characterizing post-2008 policies toward BITs as an “[e]ra of re-orientation” with governments “evaluating the costs and benefits of [BITs] and reflecting on their future objects and
strategies as regards these treaties”).
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protectionist, including reviving the RLR and limiting the availability of ISDS.8
This Note will examine these reforms offered in BITs negotiated in the late2010s to determine whether they accomplish the goals of reformers and whether
other legal doctrines in the international investment regime will frustrate these
reforms.
Part I of this Note discusses the political and legal underpinnings that led to
the reform of BITs in the late-2010s. Part II discusses the policy interests that
motivated reformers when drafting 2010s BITs. Part III examines the choice of
fora and exhaustion clauses in individual BITs to determine whether they fulfil
the policy interests that reformers sought. Part IV offers a cursory exploration of
pitfalls that the reformed dispute resolution systems face when brought before
international tribunals. Part V offers concluding thoughts on how these BITs and
their dispute resolution clauses may affect the international investment regime
and the law of ISDS tribunals.
A. Contemporary Issues in International Investment Law: The ISDS
Regime9
Many of the reform efforts taken in the late-2010s stem from the failure of the
Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the mid- to late-2000s.10 After
the 1999 WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle failed to start a new round of trade
negotiations, the Doha Round of the WTO also stalled as middle-income countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa sought concessions
to bolster their geopolitical and geo-economic positions and interests.11 In the
Doha Round, the WTO had expected to conclude an international FDI treaty, but
this effort failed when the Doha Round collapsed in the mid-2000s.12 Among the
8
See Matthew C. Porterfield, Exhaustion of Local Remedies in Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 1, 3 (2015).
9
The application of realpolitik to the realm of international trade and investment laws
inform and nuance many of the arguments advanced in this Note. See, e.g., HENRY KISSINGER,
DIPLOMACY 832 (1994) (“If the principles of the [WTO] in fact prevail, the Western Hemisphere will be a major participant in global economic growth. If discriminatory regional groupings dominate, the Western Hemisphere, with its vast market, will be able to compete effectively . . . . In a world where America is often obliged to strike a balance between its values
and its necessities, it has discovered that its ideals and its geopolitical objectives mesh substantially.”); GEORGE C. HERRING, FROM COLONY TO SUPERPOWER: U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS
SINCE 1776, at 926 (2008) (“[i]n embassies across the world, diplomats turned their attention
to economics” as the Cold War ended, NAFTA was passed, and the WTO emerged).
10
DAVID A. GANTZ, LIBERALIZING INTERNATIONAL TRADE AFTER DOHA: MULTILATERAL,
PLURILATERAL, REGIONAL, AND UNILATERAL INITIATIVES 28, 34 (2013).
11
Id. at 33–36.
12
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶¶ 20–22,
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002). The WTO dropped these efforts as
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reasons proffered to explain the failure of the Doha Round, scholars point to:
divergence in the objectives of developing states, the fear of Chinese economic
growth, lack of political will, the expansion of government regulation of climate
change, and the lack of strong support from business stakeholders.13 With regard
to the lack of support from business stakeholders, the business stakeholders
wanted reforms in services, investment, and e-commerce, while the WTO and
other political stakeholders focused on tariff and non-tariff barrier reduction.14
From the ashes of WTO-led negotiations, bilateral (e.g., BITs)15 and plurilateral (e.g., NAFTA, USMCA) preferential trade agreements on more limited issues emerged, backed by global business interests.16 While these agreements
more immediately addressed the needs of the business community, they created
a complex patchwork of inconsistent protections, obligations, and other regulations.17 While some commentators and academics retained hope in the early2010s that there would be a multilateral solution to the problem of FDI regulation,18 mid-decade shifts in political mores made this increasingly unlikely.

early as 2004, suggesting that, had the Doha Round proceeded further, a multilateral investment treaty or protocol would not have been in the final agreements. See The Doha Declaration Explained, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm#investment (last visited Feb. 11, 2021). It is reasonable to assume that such an
agreement would follow the course of other attempted multilateral investment frameworks and
end without a deal. See Trishna Menon & Gladwin Isaac, Developing Country Opposition to
an Investment Court: Could State-State Dispute Settlement be an Alternative?, WOLTERS
KLUWER: KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Feb. 17, 2018), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/02/17/developing-country-opposition-investment-court-state-state-disputesettlement-alternative/; Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Draft Consolidated Text, at 7, OECD Doc.
DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1 (Apr. 22, 1998) (embodying a draft document for a multilateral FDI
treaty prepared for the failed Seattle Round).
13
GANTZ, supra note 10, at 38–44.
14
Id. at 41–43; see also Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, WTO Talks Crashed When
Developing Nations Balked at Taking Up Some ‘Singapore Issues’, INT’L TRADE REP. (Sept.
18, 2003) (reporting out failure of the WTO conference appeared to stem from unwillingness
of developing countries to “move away from agricultural issues to the so-called Singapore
issues”).
15
See Pruzin & Yerkey, supra note 14 (quoting Frank Vargo, former U.S. government
official and then-National Association of Manufacturers’ Vice President for International Economic Affairs: “I wouldn’t be surprised if [the United States] puts much more emphasis on
bilateral trade talks without giving up on the WTO.”).
16
Andrew L. Stoler, Addressing 21st Century “WTO-Plus” Issues in the Multilateral
Trading System, in THE FUTURE AND THE WTO: CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGES 42 (Ricardo
Meléndez-Ortiz, Christophe Bellmann & Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza eds., July 2012),
https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/79786/mod_resource/content/1/the-future-and-thewto-confronting-the-challenges.pdf.
17
Id. at 44.
18
See, e.g., id.
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While the collapse of the Doha Round created the legal backdrop for FDI and
BIT reform, the political will for this reform stems from policies associated with
the candidacy and election of Donald Trump to the U.S. Presidency. During the
2016 U.S. presidential campaign, Donald Trump and his advisors made largely
protectionist economic promises.19 In May 2016, then-Trump supporter and
later-Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross expressed concerns about the rising
economic power of China and its state-controlled debt and currency markets.20
As the election progressed, investors began to fear major drops in Asian stocks
following a Trump victory, citing as an important factor “‘unpredictable’ foreign
policy” that may produce beneficial individual outcomes through negotiation but
would aggregate into substantial losses or underperformance across Asia.21 Campaign bluster quickly turned into action after inauguration, with Trump taking
executive action to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and reorienting U.S. international trade and investment policy.22
World leaders prepared for a vacuum in global political leadership as soon as
President Trump was elected.23 Under the Trump Administration, U.S. strategy
shifted towards using bilateral pacts with individual states and unilateral tariffs
to effect Trump’s trade, investment, and foreign policy objectives, harnessing the
United States’ strategic and economic heft to prevent concessions granted during
earlier plurilateral and multilateral negotiations.24 By mid-2017, these tactics
19
Maggie Haberman, Donald Trump Says He Favors Big Tariffs on Chinese Exports,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2016, 11:21 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/politics/firstdraft/2016/01/07/donald-trump-says-he-favors-big-tariffs-on-chinese-exports/.
20
Dimitra DeFotis, Q&A: Wilbur Ross on China, Yuan, Debt & Trump, BARRON’S (May
25, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/q-a-wilbur-ross-on-china-yuan-debttrump-1464184849.
21
Nomura, What a Trump Presidency Means for Asian Stocks, BARRON’S (July 26, 2016),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/what-a-trump-presidency-means-for-asian-stocks1469502034.
22
Jack Caporal, Trump Takes Executive Action Withdrawing U.S. from TPP, Collapsing
Deal, INSIDE U.S. TRADE’S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Jan. 23, 2017, 2:03 PM), https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/trump-takes-executive-action-withdrawing-us-tpp-collapsing-deal.
23
See Zachary Burdette, Today’s Headlines and Commentary, LAWFARE: HARD NAT’L
SEC. CHOICES (Nov. 9, 2016, 2:49 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/todays-headlines-andcommentary-1186 (summarizing the reactions to Trump’s election by international leaders as
reported in major news outlets the day after the U.S. election); see also Across the World,
Shock and Uncertainty at Trump’s Victory, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.c
om/2016/11/09/world/europe/global-reaction-us-presidential-election-donald-trump.html (reporting economic concerns in China and Mexico); Santiago Pérez & José de Córdoba, Donald
Trump’s Win Goes Down Hard in Mexico: Country Scrambles to Shore Up Support for Peso
As Its Frequent Attacker Secures the U.S. Presidency, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trumps-win-goes-down-hard-in-mexico-1478678362
(reporting the weakening of the Peso in after-hours trading due to the election and the precarious position of Mexican fiscal policy).
24
William Mauldin, Trump’s Big Gamble: Luring Countries Into One-on-One Trade
Deals, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2017, 5:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-big-
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launched a “trade war” between the United States and China that forms the backdrop to the topic of this Note.25
Political disruption from this shift spurred a cascade of new BIT negotiations,
giving states and political actors an opportunity to revisit the legal underpinnings
of the international investment system.26 As states faced new political and diplomatic tensions caused by such adjustments, business stakeholders similarly faced
new legal and economic challenges. Business interests globally faced populist
pressure to consider a broader range of stakeholders when making business decisions, driving business leaders to pledge to take increased responsibility for the
public good.27 Additionally, governments considered new regulations on technology, energy, and other sectors of the economy, further disrupting traditional
business activities.28 This panoply of economic and political forces drove actors’
interests in and commitment to the international trade and investment negotiations in the late-2010s, and the BITs’ efficacy must be evaluated in light of those
commitments.

gamble-luring-countries-into-one-on-one-trade-deals-1485483628. Shortly before the election, key Trump advisors outlined Trump’s Asia strategy, which comprised both prioritizing
U.S. economic clout over foreign policy goals and bolstering military presence in the region
to enforce peace. Alexander Gray & Peter Navarro, Donald Trump’s Peace Through Strength
Vision for the Asia-Pacific, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 7, 2016, 2:14 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/07/donald-trumps-peace-through-strength-vision-for-the-asia-pacific/.
25
See Dan Burns, Jonas Ekblom, & Andrea Shalal, Timeline: Key Dates in the U.S.-China
Trade War, REUTERS (Sep. 5, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tradechina-timeline/timeline-key-dates-in-the-us-china-trade-war-idUSKCN1VQ24Y (summarizing key events that escalated international trade tensions in 2017).
26
Daniel C.K. Chow et al., The Revival of Economic Nationalism and the Global Trading
System, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133, 2166–67 (2019) (discussing the role of economic protectionism in FDI regulation in the late-2010s).
27
See Business Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/BRT-Statement-onthe-Purpose-of-a-Corporation-with-Signatures-1.pdf (pledging to commit to the wellbeing of
“all” stakeholders); Nicholas Lemann, When Corporations Changed their Social Role—and
Upended Our Politics, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 6, 2019, 11:02 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-corporations-changed-their-social-roleand-upended-our-politics-11567782178.
But see Richard J. Shinder, Opinion, The Business Roundtable’s Recipe for Confusion: When
Companies Try to Do the Government’s Job, Inefficiency and Uncertainty Result, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 17, 2019, 6:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-business-roundtables-recipefor-confusion-11568760132?mod=hp_opin_pos_2 (arguing that putting anyone over shareholders is a costly mistake).
28
See, e.g., Frank Ready, Facing Regulation Tech Companies are Rolling the Dice with
Self-Regulation, LAW.COM: LEGALTECH NEWS (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/2019/09/27/facing-legislation-tech-companies-are-rolling-the-dice-with-self-regulation/.
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B. The Rule of Local Remedies
Unless abrogated by a BIT, the Rule of Local Remedies (the RLR) is the default customary rule of international law that controls whether a foreign investor
can seek remedies from an international tribunal for claims arising out of FDI.
The RLR requires claimants for international or treaty wrongs to vindicate their
rights in domestic tribunals before seeking a remedy in an international tribunal.29 The International Court of Justice recognized this customary doctrine in
the Interhandel case, noting that “[b]efore resort may be had to an international
court . . . it has been considered necessary that the State where the violation occurred should have an opportunity to redress it by its own means, within the
framework of its own domestic legal system.”30 While it originated in the context
of diplomatic protection of aliens, the RLR took on a role in additional areas of
international dispute.31
There are two fundamental views on the RLR. One view would give the RLR
substantive weight, requiring that a claimant show exhaustion of local remedies
before bringing a claim to an international tribunal.32 The other view characterizes the RLR as being merely procedural, allowing the respondent state the opportunity to adjudicate the claim in its domestic courts but not requiring exhaustion as part of the international cause of action.33
The RLR “is founded on the principal premise that the host or respondent state
must be given the opportunity of redressing the alleged injury, to an alien or
individual, which constitutes an international wrong.”34 The RLR emerged out
of the recognition of the sovereignty interests of the respondent state.35 However,
as the RLR was developed in its application, it was “influenced and somewhat
modified by the consideration of interests other than those of the host or respondent state, and particularly by taking into account the position of the alien or of
the individual in the settlement of what may be regarded as an international dispute.”36

29

CHITTHARANJAN FELIX AMERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3–4
(2d ed. 2004).
30
Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1959 I.C.J. 6, 27 (Mar. 21).
31
AMERASINGHE, supra note 29, at 35–42 (summarizing the development of the Rule in
the twentieth century outside of diplomatic protection contexts into human rights, agreements
between international organizations and states, and FDI).
32
Id. at 391.
33
Id. at 388.
34
Id. at 13.
35
Id. at 58.
36
Id. at 13.
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Among scholars, the majority view is that the RLR is a procedural rule.37 This
characterization of the RLR relies heavily upon the balancing of interests protected by the RLR between the sovereignty interests of the state and the fundamental fairness to the individual claimant, and any application of the RLR must
be based upon a choice among the competing interests that it protects.38 A consequence of a procedural character for the RLR may be that international adjudicatory bodies would be more willing to waive the RLR or apply a good faith
or estoppel doctrine to its invocation.39
A minority view among scholars and international adjudicatory bodies is that
the RLR represents a substantive requirement of seeking relief for an international wrong.40 Under this theory, a potential international claim becomes justiciable at the international level only after the respondent state denies a remedy
for the underlying internationally illegal act.41 This theory of the RLR places
much greater emphasis on the sovereignty interests of the respondent state and
would not balance that interest against the interests of the claimants.42 This theory more strongly protects the respondent state.
In the context of ISDS, categorization of the RLR as procedural or substantive
will influence decisions of international tribunals to either bypass or uphold exhaustion requirements. As BITs developed in the late twentieth century, they
tended to waive the RLR because of the belief held by mostly developed countries that the administration of justice and legal systems in predominantly developing countries was prejudiced against foreign interests.43 As this Note will
37
Id. at 416 (“This survey of what courts, tribunals and judges have done when faced with
an objection that local remedies had not been exhausted shows that the evidence conclusively
favours the view that the rule of local remedies is procedural and neither substantive nor a
combination of the two. Judges or states may have made statements supporting the view that
the rule is substantive, but the practice of judicial bodies relating to the rule leads overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the rule has not been treated as substantive or as both substantive
and procedural but as solely procedural in character.”); see also George K. Foster, Striking a
Balance Between Investor Protections and National Sovereignty: The Relevance of Local
Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 201, 210 (2011)
(“Most modern authorities describe the exhaustion of local remedies rule as procedural in nature, because it has the effect of barring the admissibility of a claim even if it is valid on the
merits.”).
38
AMERASINGHE, supra note 29, at 62–64.
39
AMERASINGHE, supra note 29, at 400–02. See also NOAH RUBINS, THOMAS-NEKTARIOS
PAPANASTASIOU & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, POLITICAL RISK, AND
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 311–12 (2d ed. 2020) (in practice, the Rule
embodies a requirement of jurisdiction rather than substance).
40
Id. at 389. Foster, supra note 37, at 238–43 (recognizing that some specific claims arising under a BIT may require a showing that local remedies were exhausted or were inadequate
as part of the merits of that claim).
41
AMERASINGHE, supra note 29, at 391.
42
Id. at 397.
43
Id. at 41.
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explore, beginning in the mid-2010s, states reconsidered the policy implications
of waiver of the RLR in BIT negotiations. Examining a sampling of the BITs
negotiated in the late-2010s, many states attempted to reimpose the RLR, reflecting a stronger policy preference toward the host states’ sovereignty interest.
However, other doctrines and litigation tactics that developed among practitioners and the arbitral panels impose uncertainty on the ultimate efficacy of these
more recent BITs that reimpose the RLR.

II.

BITS STATUS QUO

A. Geopolitical and Geo-Economic Forces Guiding BITs from 1994 to 2015
Prior to the failure of the Doha Round of the WTO in the mid-2000s, liberalization of trade and increasing globalization were important factors in the development of international trade law.44 These narratives also impacted the development of international investment law and BIT negotiations. Modern BITs
originated in the 1950s and 1960s largely between developed Western European
countries and developing countries. These early BITs heavily favored the developed countries from which the FDI originated, a trend that continued through to
BITs negotiated after the Uruguay Round.45 Some governments saw BITs as
providing much-needed clarity to the largely unregulated sphere of international
investment law.46 Other governments, particularly those of developing states, associated signing BITs with foreign investment flowing into their countries.47
However, empirical studies suggest a lack of any connection between BITs and
the flow of foreign direct investment.48
After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations in 1994, the
BIT regime expanded.49 While each BIT is unique in some way, negotiations
generally begin with a model BIT proffered by a developed nation to use as a

44

GANTZ, supra note 10, at 16–26.
MARIA A. GWYNN, POWER IN THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK 47 (2016).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 127–35; see also Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties 2 (Yale L. Sch. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Pub. Pol’y, Research Paper No. 293,
2005) (finding a very weak relationship between BITs and FDI).
49
See BITs 1995–2006, supra note 6, at 143.
45
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template.50 The use of templates results in BITs that, while not identical, contain
extremely similar language and terms.51
Due to the imbalance of bargaining power between developed states and developing states,52 most of the treaties entered into immediately after the Uruguay
Round slanted power towards the developed states.53 This was in part because of
the ISDS international arbitration provisions.54 Contrary to the customary RLR,
international arbitration became a primary rather than a subsidiary means of adjudicating disputes, with very few BITs including strict exhaustion requirements.55 Many BITs gave the investors the right to initially choose between different dispute resolution regimes and then be bound to their choice, in what are
known as “fork-in-the-road” clauses.56 Other BITs gave the investors unequivocal access to international arbitration.57 A handful created unique arbitral systems
within the treaty itself.58

50

Id. at 91.
Id. at 91–92.
52
See generally GWYNN, supra note 45, at 43–83 (surveying historical BITs and the power
struggle between developed and developing countries).
53
Id. at 117–18.
54
Id. at 117.
55
BITs 1995-2006, supra note 6, at 108.
56
See, e.g., 2008 Austrian Model BIT, art. 14(1), in COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL
INVESTMENT TREATIES 39 (Chester Brown ed., 2013) [hereinafter COMMENTARIES]; Chinese
Model BIT, art. 9(2), in COMMENTARIES at 172; Colombian 2009 Model IIA, art. IX.7, in
COMMENTARIES, supra, at 231; Switzerland–Cambodia BIT, art. 11(4), in COMMENTARIES,
supra, at 692 n.316; cf. 2003 Italian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. X(3), in
COMMENTARIES 340–41 (embodying a fork-in-the-road provision that is not “strict” because
the options “do not seem to be exclusive”); UK Model IPPA (2008), art. 8, in COMMENTARIES,
supra, at 743–44 (providing a “Preferred” and an “Alternative” option). Many of these and
other treaties are not titled as a “Bilateral Investment Treaty”; however, they all deal with the
regulation of FDI and unless placed within the context of a larger economic treaty such as
NAFTA are collectively referred to as BITs.
57
See, e.g., Canadian Model FIPA, art. 26, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 56, at 108;
German Model BIT (2009), art. 10, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 56, at 316–17; Netherlands’
Model Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (2004), art. 9,
in COMMENTARIES, supra note 56, at 580; Singapore Present IGA, art. 13(2), in
COMMENTARIES, supra note 56, at 644; United States 2012 Model BIT, art. 24, in
COMMENTARIES, supra note 56, at 821–22.
58
See, e.g., Latvia Model BIT, art. 10, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 56, at 456–58 (setting out rules for arbitral tribunal creation); NAFTA Chapter 11, art. 1116, in COMMENTARIES,
supra note 56, at 500.
51
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B. Policy Interests at Stake

i. Economic Protectionism
The return of economic protectionism as a legitimate policy objective marks
a major policy change in BITs negotiated in the late-2010s.59 Before the election
of Donald Trump to the U.S. Presidency legitimized economic protectionism as
a policy choice in international economic law, states and commentators expressed wariness toward ISDS arbitral tribunals convened by private parties with
the power to disrupt domestic regulatory systems.60 Some advocated a resurrection of the RLR in the realm of the ISDS to avoid this critique.61 Economic protectionism is the preeminent driving force in the movement towards the resurrection of the RLR. However, other more nuanced concerns of both policy and
business leaders that emerged during the failure of the Doha negotiations also
influence the round of BITs renegotiations that emerged in the second half of the
2010s.

ii. Legitimacy Crisis
A legitimacy crisis, real or perceived, of the ISDS system also influences the
BIT negotiations. At the beginning of the 2010s, scholars of the international
trade and investment regime came together to criticize the ISDS system on a
number of grounds.62 While recognizing that “[a]ll investors . . . should have
59

See supra notes 20–28 and accompanying text.
See Vera Korzun, The Right to Regulate in Investor-State Arbitration: Slicing and Dicing Regulatory Carve-Outs, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 355, 382 (2017) (“[Investor–state dispute settlement] allows foreign corporations to interfere with the host government’s ability to
regulate, constraining the state’s capacity to function for the benefit of the public.”); Stephan
W. Schill, Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the Standard of
Review, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 577, 578 (2012) (collecting criticisms regarding investor-state dispute settlement as “intrud[ing] into the regulatory space of host states”); George
K. Foster, Investor-Community Conflicts in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Rethinking
“Reasonable Expectations” and Expecting More from Investors, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 105, 108
n.3 (2019) (collecting “Community Conflict Cases” where foreign investors have sought damages through international arbitration for the cancellation of development projects after community backlash due to water contamination, destruction of sacred sites, or endangerment of
plants or wildlife).
61
See, e.g., Porterfield, supra note 8, at 1–3.
62
Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, OSGOODE HALL L. SCH.
(Aug. 31, 2010), https://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement-international-investment60
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access to an open and independent judicial system,” the scholars wanted to balance this interest with an understanding that international arbitration for ISDS
settlement was “a means to the end of advancing the public welfare and must not
be treated as an end in itself.”63 These scholars perceived that the ISDS system
favored too heavily the protection of investors and undermined the states’ fundamental rights.64 Specifically, they argued that the ISDS system needed to become more transparent and that investment contracts needed to be “concluded
and implemented in accordance with the principles of public accountability and
openness and should preserve the state’s right to regulate in good faith and for a
legitimate purpose.”65
Arbitrators who sit on these ISDS arbitral tribunals likewise face key questions
that lead to issues of legitimacy. Greater generality and ambiguity of BITs and
other international agreements lead to more judicial discretion, which affects the
rights and obligations of the states.66 However, the arbitrators themselves may
prefer restraint in their pronouncements, to either the chagrin or benefit of the
states or parties involved, because of the inherent uncertainty and discretion inherent in certain areas of international law.67
At least one commentator suggests that a solution to this legitimacy crisis is
increased diplomatic discourse and negotiations as a means of dispute settlement,
both through formal mechanisms in the provisions of BITs and informally
though other channels and mechanisms.68 While this system may greatly appeal
to states, investors fear the efficacy of these systems to properly protect their
reliance interest as such systems restrict investors’ ability to vindicate their rights
under BITs.69
regime-31-august-2010/. These legitimacy questions are not new. In 1988, the late Professor
Philippe Fouchard lamented the plague of misconduct and procedural disputes that characterized the field of international arbitration. Phillippe Fouchard, Où va l’arbitrage international?
[Where Is International Arbitration Going?], 34 MCGILL L.J. 435, 450 (1989).
63
Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, supra note 62.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
ANDRÉS RIGO SUREDA, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: JUDGING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY 9 (2012) (citing Elihu Lauterpacht, The Development of the Law of International Organization by the Decisions of International Tribunals, 152 RECUEIL DES COURS 377,
389 (1976)). International arbitral bodies do not have a rule of stare decisis as Anglo-American
courts do. Instead, the strength of prior international decisions is generally assessed by the
persuasiveness of their justification. Instead, future international tribunals have discretion to
rely on the logical justifications, policy considerations, or even the members of previous panels in making decisions. Id. at 11.
67
Id. at 19.
68
Matilde Recanati, Diplomatic Intervention and State-to-State Arbitration As an Alternative Means for the Protection of Foreign Investments and Host States’ General Interests:
The Italian Experience, in GENERAL INTERESTS OF HOSTS STATES IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 422, 424 (Giorgio Sacerdoti et al. eds., 2014).
69
See infra Part IV.
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At the beginning of the 2010s, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) suggested model clauses for BIT dispute resolution
procedures as a solution to the legitimacy crisis.70 UNCTAD explored increasing
opportunities for amicable or diplomatic resolution and promoting alternative
dispute resolution.71 However, UNCTAD strongly advocated the return to viewing international resolution as an extraordinary measure by reasserting the importance of the RLR.72 Specifically, UNCTAD suggested that state parties
should convert “fork-in-the-road” treaty provisions into “no-U-turn” clauses and
toll statutes of limitations while investors exhaust their claims in local courts.73
iii. Fair and Equitable Treatment—Reliance Interests and Legitimate
Expectations

The “Fair and Equitable Treatment” (FET) clause that is a standard term in
most BITs, also known as the “International Minimum Standard,” provides another important policy interest in negotiating BITs.74 Policymakers, scholars, and
international tribunals often disagree regarding the scope of this term and its application to ISDS.75 Textually, FET clauses provide a balancing test, weighing
fairness toward the investor with a rule of law principle and interacting with the
particular interests and expectations of foreign investors.76 Arbitration panels
must interpret these provisions on a case-by-case basis, defining the normative
content of the standard in the context of individual treatments.77
In tackling the FET balancing standard, arbitration panels point to interests
such as: Protection of the “basic expectations that were taken into account by the
foreign investor to make the investment”; the expectation that “the host State . . .
act in a consistent manner”; and the expectation that “the State . . . use the legal
70

See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Dispute Settlement,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2013/2 (Dec. 2013), at 173–91.
71
Id. at 175–76, 195–97.
72
Id. at 177–78.
73
Id. at 178.
74
As reflected in BITs negotiated in the late-2010s, there is a dispute among practitioners
as to whether FET provisions equate to the American concept of due process of law, but scholars and commentators generally consider “Fair and Equitable Treatment” provisions, customary “International Minimum Standard,” and the conceptual term “due process of law” to be
related. See Mara Valenti, The Protection of the General Interests of Host States in the Application of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, in GENERAL INTERESTS OF HOSTS STATES
IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 26, 29–32 (Giorgio Sacerdoti et al. eds., 2014).
75
See id. at 54–56.
76
Id. at 34–35 (citing DOMINIQUE CARREAU & PATRICK JUILLARD, DROIT INTERNATIONAL
ÉCONOMIQUE 463 (2007)).
77
Id. at 35–38.
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instruments . . . in conformity with the function usually assigned to such instruments.”78 Panels focus heavily on the concept of “legitimate reasonable expectations” as well as the stability, consistency, predictability, and transparency of the
regulatory framework.79 When addressing claims under FET standards, the arbitral tribunals ultimately weigh the “State’s legitimate right to regulate the relevant economic sector [against] the behaviour taken by the foreign investor itself.”80
Unresolved in FET arbitration is whether the protections of the FET standard
extend to procedural rules of ISDS. Some panels have interpreted FET standards
to allow a claim notwithstanding exhaustion requirements because of a breach of
notions of due process.81 In Lemire v. Ukraine, an arbitration arising out of an
allegedly unfair administrative procedure toward the foreign investor, the panel
allowed a FET claim even though the complaining foreign investor had not pursued available local judicial remedies.82 The panel interpreted the applicable FET
clause as a balancing test that required only reasonableness in the claimants decision not to pursue local remedies weighed against the state’s sovereignty interests and the investor’s other legitimate expectation.83 Ultimately in that arbitration, the panel concluded that there was inequitable treatment toward the foreign
investor under the FET standard in the administrative regulation and licensing of
radio frequencies.84
While the reasoning and persuasiveness of Lemire is uncertain, policy concerns advocate extending the protections of FET provisions to cover procedural
interests so that the FET provisions impose substantive requirements on the ISDS
procedure. The 2004 U.S. Model BIT implicated such policy concerns when it
obliged procedural rules “not to deny justice . . . in accordance with the principle
of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world.”85 These
due process standards often include substantive requirements for procedure on
top of purely procedural protections.86
78

Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. FILJ 158 (2004).
79
See Valenti, supra note 74, at 39–40.
80
Id. at 52.
81
See, e.g., Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Liability (Jan. 14, 2010).
82
Id. ¶ 277.
83
Id. ¶¶ 282, 284–85.
84
Id. ¶¶ 419–21. A factor that seemed to weigh heavily on the panel’s decision was the
opaqueness of the administrative law principles at work in the circumstances that led to the
controversy before the panel. See id. ¶¶ 293–317.
85
2004 U.S. Model BIT, art. 5.2(a), https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Sectors/
Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).
86
See, e.g., Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (declaring that due process requires that procedure “not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”).
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The FET standard may also incorporate the idea that investment treaties and
their dispute settlement mechanisms should “give legal protection to the investor’s expectations created by the host state’s representation or conduct.”87 While
arbitration panels often apply an equitable view of protection to the “legitimate
reasonable expectations” of the investors, the panels have not applied such a view
consistently.88
Another conceptualization of the FET standard suggests that it protects reliance interests in the international investment regime by functioning in a promissory estoppel-type manner.89 While the proposal does not address the substantive
goal of furthering development through international investment law, it presents
an interesting argument for rethinking remedies under international trade law,
suggesting that remedies should protect reliance-based interests rather than expectancy-based interests.90 Under this theory, the protected interest is only the
investment rather than including its potential profits, shifting risk from the host
country to the investor in any particular investment.91
When addressing the issues within the investor-state dispute settlement regime, drafters, statesmen, and other practitioners must consider, consistent with
the developed FET jurisprudence, the fairness upon which investors rely when
making private investment decisions. The promissory estoppel-like reliance theory of the FET standard is an explicit recognition of the importance of the reliance interests that investors hold in the international investment regime. Resort
to investor-state dispute settlement in the form of international arbitration encapsules part of that reliance interest, although the perceived benefits of international
arbitration may stem from deeply rooted biases.92 Removal of procedural rights
that investors perceive as preferable may undermine the whole international investment system and the reliance interest implicit in the FET standard.

87
TEERAWAT WONGKAEW, PROTECTION OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS IN INVESTMENT
TREATY ARBITRATION: A THEORY OF DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE 3 (2019).
88
See generally id.; see also Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, ¶ 7.75 (Nov. 30, 2012)
(protecting legitimate reasonable expectations is the “most important function of the fair and
equitable treatment standard”); Int’l Thunderbird Gaming v. United Mexican States, Separate
Opinion of Thomas Wälde, ¶ 37 (Dec. 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0432.pdf (finding “a self-standing subcategory and independent basis for a
claim [based upon a theory of detrimental reliance upon reasonable expectations] under the
‘fair and equitable standard’”).
89
See generally WONGKAEW, supra note 87.
90
Id. at 233–64.
91
Id. at 264.
92
See AMERASINGHE, supra note 29, at 41–42 (suggesting that while developing states
have legitimate reasons to disfavor waiver of the Rule of Local Remedies, investors from developed states will consider international arbitration more favorable because of the sophistication of the arbitrators appointed and a forum that has intrinsic biases towards themselves).
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EXAMINATION OF BITS

This Note examines a sample of BITs and sorts them into general categories
to discuss the structure of their dispute settlement clauses and their implications
with regard to the changing role of the RLR and exhaustion. Unfortunately, very
few claims have come before an arbitration panel arising under BITs negotiated
in the late-2010s, such that no panel has analyzed these dispute settlement
clauses. Their contrasting textual language, though, implicates divergent interests that inform a normative assessment of these BITs.
Perhaps more interesting than the contrasts between different states’ agreements are internal inconsistencies, where individual states agreed to differing
obligations in different BITs. In this sampling for example, the UAE agreed to
BITs with the traditional “fork-in-the-road” provision, a limited “fork-in-theroad” provision, automatic international arbitration, and a treaty-established tribunal.93 These inconsistencies alone may indicate a structural policy issue with
increasingly individualized BITs. The failure to establish a multilateral solution
to issues in international investment law led to a sometimes-inconsistent patchwork of BITs, straining the international arbitration infrastructure to establish
policy solutions.94
In light of the policy issues discussed above, these inconsistencies undermine
the policy aims of reformers, potentially introducing more distrust of the international law system, apprehension from investors, and inequitable treatment between states.

93

Compare Acuerdo Entre Los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y La República Oriental Del
Uruguay para La Promoción y Protección Recíprocas de Inversiones, U.A.E.-Uru., art. 11(4),
Oct.
24,
2018,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5813/download [hereinafter UAE-Uruguay BIT], with Agreement Between
Japan and the United Arab Emirates for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, JapanU.A.E., Apr. 30, 2018, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5741/download [hereinafter Japan-UAE BIT], and Agreement Between the
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of
China and the Government of the United Arab Emirates for the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, art. 8(5), H.K.-U.A.E., June 16, 2019, UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treatyfiles/5865/download [hereinafter Hong Kong-UAE BIT], and Cooperation and Facilitation
Investment Agreement Between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the United Arab Emirates, art. 1, Braz.-U.A.E., Mar. 15, 2019, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5855/download [hereinafter Brazil-UAE BIT].
94
See Stoler, supra note 16.
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A. Extreme Exhaustion Requirements
Treaties based upon the 2016 India Model BIT generated the most discussion
in the BIT negotiations of the late-2010s because they impose a strict exhaustion
requirement for dispute resolution in local courts.95 While India’s previous
model BIT contained a typical “fork-in-the-road” provision,96 the new model
BIT requires complete exhaustion of local remedies before an international arbitration panel may hear an investor’s dispute.97 Prior to adopting this model BIT,
India had been served numerous notices for international arbitration of ISDS after a foreign corporation won an arbitration award relying on a term of one Indian
BIT that promised “effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights.”98
India’s narrowing of international arbitration is, in many respects, a reaction to
this explosion of arbitration.99 Concluded BITs include this provision. For example, the Belarus-India BIT adopts a strict five-year exhaustion requirement,
which, while not indefinite as in the model BIT, is effectively indefinite.100
India’s model BIT generated much debate, with commentators expressing
skepticism about the exhaustion requirements. Brookings India released a responsive report on the developments in India’s international trade and investment
policy, with the subtitle questioning “Is India Too Risk Averse?”101 Some commentators suggested that the document does not truly cure the issues India sought
to address, as indicated and compared to a March 2015 draft model BIT which
had included obligations on investors to comply with host state laws,
95

Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty (2016), art. 14.3,
https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf
[hereinafter 2016 India Model BIT].
96
Indian Model Text of BIPA (2003), art. 9(2), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1026.pdf.
97
2016 India Model BIT, supra note 95.
98
See White Indus. Austr. v. Republic of India, Final Award (Nov. 30, 2011),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0906.pdf; see also PRABHASH
RANJAN ET AL., INDIA’S MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY: IS INDIA TOO RISK AVERSE?
8–9 (2018) (summarizing India’s backlash against BITs and investor-state dispute settlement
generally).
99
RANJAN, supra note 98, at 8–9. The Model BIT also narrows other traditional BIT terms
such as the FET standard and the Most-Favored Nation provisions. Id. at 20–28. Circumscribing the FET standard may push the India BIT beyond the pale for investors or even state partners who might fear rampant protectionism or could push international arbitration panels to
craft a customary solution notwithstanding the plain meaning of the text.
100
Treaty Between the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of India on Investments,
Belr.-India,
art.
15.2,
Sep.
24,
2018,
UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5724/do
wnload.
101
RANJAN, supra note 98, at 1.
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transparency and anti-corruption standards, and imposed severe consequences
for breach of those obligations.102 The March 2015 draft had also included several provisions protecting the host state’s regulatory space and broadened some
exceptions to the BIT.103 These provisions sought to cure the issues identified
over the course of the White Industries and subsequent international arbitration.
Others commented upon the inability of India to disengage from the ISDS
system, despite the new model BIT significantly altering the terms of India’s
engagement.104 Still other industry professionals and commentators noted that
this model BIT and India’s foreign investment policy lacked a “robust framework
for protection of investors and investments.”105 They indicated desire for more
fundamental change: “What India awaits is a legal and regulatory framework that
is not adversarial or difficult for the foreign investor but instills confidence and
faith in order to nurture smooth and beneficial economic relationships towards
effective and sustainable development of both – the foreign investor and the Republic of India.”106
While this extreme form of the exhaustion requirement does protect the sovereignty interest and expands the state’s ability to regulate FDI, commentators’
reactions indicate that such requirements scare investors. This alone undermines
the efficacy of BITs with strict exhaustion requirements in encouraging investments.
B. Traditional Fork-in-the-Road
Some states chose to retain the traditional “fork-in-the-road” dispute settlement provisions, giving potential litigants the choice of fora.107 The pertinent
provisions of these BITs do not vary significantly from the older BITs that
102
Jesse Coleman & Kanika Gupta, India’s Revised Model BIT: Two Steps Forward, One
Step Back?, OXFORD L. CTR.: INV. CLAIMS (Oct. 4, 2017), https://oxia.ouplaw.com/page/631.
103
Id.
104
Ranjan, supra note 98, at 38.
105
NISHITH DESAI ASSOCS., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND INDIA:
WITH SPECIAL FOCUS ON INDIA MODEL BIT, 2016 51 (Feb. 2018),
http://www.nishithdesai.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/Research_Papers/Bilateral_Invest
ment_Treaty_Arbitration_and_India-PRINT-2.pdf.
106
Id. at 51.
107
See, e.g., Agreement Between Australia and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay on the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-Uru., art. 14(5), Apr. 5, 2019, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5853/download
[hereinafter Australia-Uruguay BIT]; UAE-Uruguay BIT, supra note 93, at art. 11(4); Accord
Entre le Gouvernement de la Republique du Mali et le Gouvernement de la Republique de
Turquie Relatif a la Promotion et la Protection Reciproques des Investissements, Mali-Turk.,
art. 10(2), Mar. 2, 2018, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5740/download [hereinafter Mali-Turkey BIT].
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contained these provisions.108 This model allows the foreign investor to retain
significant control over the ISDS process. In many ways, this bucks against the
interests driving the current round of BIT renegotiations. Perhaps, though, this
model demonstrates a pragmatic understanding of the limitations of many features present in the system designed to protect host state interests.109
C. Fork-in-the-Road with Limitations
As discussed above, a traditional “fork-in-the-road” clause allows investors to
choose the body that will adjudicate disputes arising under the given BIT. The
choice an investor makes may or may not be binding and limit their ability to
bring disputes before alternative bodies. In BIT negotiations in the late-2010s,
some states limited traditional “fork-in-the-road” provisions by only allowing
international tribunals to exercise limited subject matter jurisdiction.110
One exemplar agreement, the Indonesia-Australia BIT, strongly prefers resolution in Indonesia’s domestic courts if Indonesia is the disputing Party.111 The
Turkey-Cambodia BIT only allows investment activities that received the permission of the Turkey legislature to initiate international arbitration, and the
108
Compare, e.g., Australia-Uruguay BIT, supra note 107, at art. 14(5) (“A claimant may
submit a claim . . . under one of the following alternatives: (a) to a competent court of the
Party in whose territory the investment is made . . . or (b) the ICSID Convention . . . or (c)
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules . . . or (d) the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; or (e) by
agreement, to any other arbitral institution or any other arbitration rules.”), with, e.g., 2008
Austrian Model BIT, supra note 56, at art. 14 (allowing investors to submit claims to a competent court of the party, previously agreed dispute settlement procedure, the ICSID, under
UNCITRAL, or to the ICC). This provides an example of continuity among BITs negotiated
after the Uruguay Round and BITs negotiated in the late-2010s.
109
See infra Part IV.
110
See, e.g., Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement,
Austl.-Indon., at ch. 14, Feb. 6, 2020, https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/iacepa-chapter-14-investment.pdf [hereinafter Indonesia-Australia BIT]; Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia on the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Cambodia-Turk., Oct. 21, 2018,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5833/do
wnload [hereinafter Turkey-Cambodia BIT]; Accord Entre le Gouvernement du Royaume du
Maroc et le Gouvernement de la Republique du Congo sur la Promotion et la Protection Reciproques des Investissements, Congo-Morocco, Apr. 30, 2018, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5809/download [hereinafter Morocco-Congo BIT]; Japan-UAE BIT, supra note 93; Accord Relatif a la Promotion et la
Protection Reciproques des Investissements Entre le Gouvernement de la Republique du Mali
et Le Gouvernement des Emirats Arabes Unis, Mali-U.A.E., Mar. 6, 2018, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5770/download [hereinafter Mali-UAE BIT].
111
Indonesia-Australia BIT, supra note 110, at art. 14.25(1)(a).
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agreement excludes any dispute related to “property and real rights upon the real
estates” from international arbitration.112 In the Morocco-Congo BIT, an investor
cannot submit a dispute to international arbitration if it has been submitted to
domestic courts and decided without significant delay.113 In the Japan-UAE BIT,
a party may not “appeal” a final decision of a domestic court or administrative
tribunal to an international arbitration panel.114 In the Mali-UAE BIT, a contracting party—the state—may demand that domestic courts hear the investor-state
dispute.115
These deviate from earlier “fork-in-the-road” forum selection clauses by placing more control over the choice of arbitral forum in the hands of the host state.
Many of these agreements also contain language to limit the effects of other doctrines on the area of dispute settlement, such as the incorporation of dispute resolution clauses from other BITs through a most-favored nation clause.116
A dispute arising under these BITs may still attempt to reach an international
tribunal through investor-state dispute resolution. The arbitral tribunal, if it applies a procedural theory of the RLR, may be more willing to waive the exhaustion requirements that the state parties attempted to impose in these BITs.117
However, these states have attempted to impose a stronger policy favoring sovereignty in the very text of the BITs with respect to the RLR by, for example,
excluding the application of the Most Favored Nations doctrine to forum choice
and including political actors in the forum selection for investor-state dispute
settlement. While some panels have followed these limitations on BITs,118 other
panels may apply additional doctrines that would limit the effectiveness of these
clauses.

112

Turkey-Cambodia BIT, supra note 110, at art. 9(4)(a)–(b).
Morocco-Congo BIT, supra note 110, at art. 9(2)(c).
114
Japan-UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 17(5)(a).
115
Mali-UAE BIT, supra note 110, at art 11(3).
116
See, e.g., Indonesia-Australia BIT supra note 110, at art. 14.5(3) (“For greater certainty,
the [Most-Favored Nation Treatment provision] shall not encompass international dispute resolution procedures . . . .”); Turkey-Cambodia BIT, supra note 110, at art. 3(4)(c) (Most-Favored Nation treatment “shall not apply in respect of dispute settlement provisions”); Morocco-Congo BIT, supra note 110, at art. 3(2) (stating that Most-Favored Nation treatment
will not apply with respect to the right of an investor to submit a dispute to any other dispute
settlement procedure”); Japan-UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 4(6) (Most-Favored NationTreatment “does not include treatment accorded to investors of a non-Contracting party and
their investments concerning the settlement of investment disputes”).
117
AMERASINGHE, supra note 29, at 400–02.
118
See also ICS Inspection & Control Servs. v. Argentine Republic, PCA Case No. 20109, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 243–73, 280 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0416.pdf (arbitral panel interpreting similar language in a BIT as a substantive limitation on a state’s consent to the panel’s
jurisdiction).
113
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D. No Exhaustion: Always Have the International Option
Other states chose to retain a continuous option of international arbitration in
their BITs, always allowing foreign investors to take disputes to the international
level.119 These BITs, which have a strong default preference for international
arbitration, may appeal more to the investor who wants the international option
to vindicate his rights. This liberal grant of arbitral jurisdiction would provide
more certainty as to where the disputes will end up in the investor-state dispute
settlement regime.
E. Treaty-Established Tribunal
Other states established unique tribunal or arbitral systems through BITs.120
These provisions allow states, in crafting their investment obligations, to tailor
the scope of their international liability and exposure. These provisions also generally place the burden on the state parties to pursue international arbitration
against their trading partners, rather than allowing foreign investors—private
parties—to pursue international remedies.121 Other BITs may allow private

119
See, e.g., Hong Kong-UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 8(5); Agreement Between the
Argentine Republic and Japan for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, art. 25(4), Arg.Japan, Dec. 1, 2018, UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5799/download [hereinafter Argentina-Japan BIT];
Agreement Between Japan and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, art. 23(4), Japan-Jordan, Nov. 27, 2018, UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5808/do
wnload [hereinafter Japan-Jordan BIT].
120
See, e.g., Investment Protection Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member States, of the One Part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam of the Other Part, art. 3.33,
Eur.-Viet., June 30, 2019, UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5868/download [hereinafter E.U.-Vietnam
BIT]; Economic Partnership Agreement Between the CARIFORUM States, of the One Part,
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the Other Part, art. 202-07,
C.A.R.I.F.O.R.U.M.-U.K., Mar. 22, 2019, UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5822/download [hereinafter
CARIFORUM-UK BIT]; Free Trade Agreement Between Brazil and Chile, Braz.-Chile, ch.
21, Nov. 21, 2018, UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5821/download [hereinafter Brazil-Chile BIT].
121
See CARIFORUM-UK BIT, supra note 120, at art. 206 (only Parties allowed to initiate
the special arbitration procedure allowed under the BIT); Brazil-Chile BIT, supra note 120
(establishing an administrative agency for the resolution of disputes between the investor of
one state and the other state).
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investors to bring international arbitration but only under a procedure and tribunal as established under the BIT.122

F. Diplomatic Process
In its BITs, Brazil pioneered a new form of dispute settlement.123 These treaties disallow the foreign investor bringing arbitration; instead, the dispute resolution and prevention mechanisms in these BITs contemplate only resolution
through diplomatic process between the state parties.124 These BITS do not grant
the foreign investor a cause of action to bring either before an international arbitral tribunal or domestic courts and instead rely upon the good will of diplomatic
process to enforce the BIT’s substantive protections.125 Importantly to this study,
the clauses severely limit the scope of consent to arbitration compared to more
traditional BIT provisions. A state party may only initiate arbitration after exhausting diplomatic negotiations.126 Even then, the agreement limits arbitration
to “determin[ing] the conformity with [the] Agreement of a measure that a Party
claims to be not in conformity with the Agreement.” unless the Parties mutually
execute a separate instrument.127
122
See EU-Vietnam BIT, supra note 120, at art. 3.38 (establishing a tribunal to hear all
claims under the BIT).
123
See Brazil-UAE BIT, supra note 93 at art. 1; Cooperation and Investment Facilitation
Agreement Between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Co-Operative Republic of Guyana, art. 1, Braz.-Guy., Dec. 13, 2018, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5763/download [hereinafter Brazil-Guyana BIT]; Agreement Between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia on Investment Cooperation and Facilitation, art. 2, Braz.-Eth., Apr. 11, 2018,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treatyfiles/5717/download [hereinafter Brazil-Ethiopia BIT]; Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement Between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Suriname,
art. 1, Braz.-Surin., May 2, 2018, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5715/download [hereinafter Brazil-Suriname BIT].
124
See Brazil-UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 24; Brazil-Guyana BIT, supra note 123, at
art. 24; Brazil-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 123, at art. 23; Brazil-Suriname BIT, supra note 123,
at art. 24.
125
See, e.g., Brazil-UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 24(3) (“If the measure in question
affects a specific investor . . . (a) the initial submission shall identify the affected investor; and
(b) representatives of the affected investor may be invited to appear before the Joint Committee.”).
126
See, e.g., id. at art. 25(1) (“Once the procedure under Paragraph 2 of Article 24 has been
exhausted and the dispute has not been resolved, either Party may submit the dispute to an ad
hoc Arbitral Tribunal . . . .”) (emphasis added).
127
Brazil-UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 25(2); Brazil-Guyana BIT, supra note 123, at
art. 25(2); Brazil-Suriname BIT, supra note 123, at art. 25(2). See also, e.g., Brazil-UAE BIT,
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This extreme limitation, while similarly restrictive compared to the severe exhaustion requirements found in India’s BITs, strikes at many of the issues that
concern states in international investment law. It removes agency from the investors and places the states themselves in control of the dispute settlement process. Lack of recourse to the international tribunals for investors may help reduce
the prercieved abuse of arbitral process by foreign investors as a means to extract
concessions from the host state.128
These treaties are largely unproven in practice at the time of this writing, and
the effects of alternative doctrines and exceptions to the RLR may frustrate these
treaty provisions. Additionally, the extremely limited right of recourse to any
treaty violation that invetors have under these treaties would seem to negate a
reliance interest that the investor has with respect to its treatment by the host
state. Indeed, these treaties attempt to disclaim any FET standard in the host
state’s conduct.129 Instead, the treaties attempt to lay out specific guarantees, although these also include broad standards similar to FET such as “due process.”130
This does leave open the possibility that an adjudicatory body could impose the
customary FET standard into these treaties through those broad guarantees that
touch upon similar policy concerns as FET clauses and FET jurisprudence.131

supra note 93, at art. 25(13) (contemplating side agreements for arbitration of discrete issues
such as damages that would otherwise fall outside of article 25’s grant of arbitral jurisdiction).
128
See Emmanuel Gaillard, Abuse of Process in International Arbitration, 32 ICSID REV.
FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1, 3 (2017) (describing potentially abusive litigation by investors).
129
Brazil-UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 4(3) (“For greater certainty, the standards of
‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ are not covered by this Agreement and shall not be used as interpretive standards in investment dispute settlement procedures.”); Brazil-Guyana BIT, supra note 123, at art. 4(4) (“For greater certainty, the standards
of fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security shall not be used or raised by
either Party to this Agreement as a ground for any dispute settlement procedure in relation to
the application or the interpretation of this Agreement.”); Brazil-Suriname BIT, supra note
123, BIT at art. 4(3) (“For greater certainty, the standards of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and
‘full protection and security’ are not governed covered by this Agreement and shall not be
used as interpretive standards in investment dispute settlement procedures.”).
130
Brazil-UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 4(2) (guarantees against “(i) Denial of access to
justice in any judicial or administrative proceedings; (ii) Breach of due process; (iii) Targeted
discrimination . . . ; (iv) Manifestly abusive treatment . . . ; [and] (v) Discrimination against
investments of investors of the other Party in law enforcement and the provision of public
security”); Brazil-Guyana BIT, supra note 123, at art. 4(1) (employing the exact same language as the Brazil-UAE BIT); Brazil-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 123, at art. 4(2) (“Each Contracting Party shall grant to investments and investors of the other Contracting Party treatment
according to the due process of law.”); Brazil-Suriname BIT, supra note 123, at art. 4(2) (“In
line with the principles of this Agreement, each Party shall ensure that all measures that affect
investment are administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner, in accordance
with the due process of law and their respective legislation.”).
131
See, supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
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LIMITATIONS OF THIS TREATY FRAMEWORK

While many of the newly-negotiated BITs attempt to resolve on a state-bystate basis the issues with the international investment system, the system itself
presents limitations which dilute the efficacy of any one of these individual BITs.
Particularly, the doctrines of futility, emergency measures, and effects of MostFavored Nation clauses, as well as legal “x-factors” such as interference by
courts or diplomacy, may limit the effects of any of these individual BITs. Some
BITs have specifically attempted to reduce the impact of these doctrines;132 however, the BITs negotiated in the late-2010s are, at the time of this writing, largely
untested, such that the efficacy of these attempts to reduce the impact of other
doctrines is unclear.
A. Futility Doctrine
Under the futility exception to the RLR, investment tribunals excused noncompliance with exhaustion in domestic courts.133 The futility exception allows
a litigant to bypass the customary requirements of exhaustion of local remedies
when pursuing those remedies would be futile because of some issue or inherent
inequality in the local judicial systems.134 While this exception is theoretically
“exceptional,” only some tribunals strictly apply the exception, with others being
more lenient or somewhere in between.135 While some commentators insist that

132

See, e.g., Indonesia-Australia BIT, supra note 110, at art. 14.5(3) (“For greater certainty, the [Most-Favored Nation Treatment provision] shall not encompass international dispute resolution procedures . . . .”); Turkey-Cambodia BIT, supra note 110, at art. 3(4)(c)
(Most-Favored Nation treatment “shall not apply in respect of dispute settlement provisions
. . . .”); Morocco-Congo BIT, supra note 110, at art. 3(2) ([“Most-favored-nation treatment
will not apply with respect to the right of an investor to submit a dispute arising out of this
Agreement to any dispute settlement procedure other than as provided in this agreement.”]);
Japan-UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 4(6) (Most-Favored Nation treatment “does not include
treatment accorded to investors of a non-Contracting Party and their investments by provisions
concerning the settlement of investment disputes”).
133
Zachary Mollengarden, The Utility of Futility: Local Remedies Rules in International
Investment Law, 58 VA. J. INT’L L. 403, 405 (2019).
134
Id. at 415.
135
Id. at 38–41.
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the proper standard should be more restrictive “obvious futility,”136 tribunals invoke this exception in a wide variety of controversies.137
B. Emergency Measures and Other Crises
Some BIT protections are unenforceable in times of economic crisis or other
emergencies.138 Most BITs contain some form of “essential security clause,”
which tends to undermine the FET guarantees in BITs by allowing states to take
emergency actions without regard to treaty obligations. Measures taken by states
in emergency circumstances are thus not ordinarily subjected to the rigors and
standards laid out in BITs. Such emergency measures may constitute an exception to the usual case that states use the renegotiated ISDS processes to protect
their interests.
The most well-known invocation of emergency measures which disrupted BIT
protections were Argentina’s defenses for actions it took during its economic
crisis of 2001.139 When Argentina defaulted on its sovereign debt, Argentina’s
creditors resorted to ISDS.140 In the arbitral proceedings, Argentina’s government attempted to assert the defense of necessity to the economic emergency.141
The panel adopted the necessity jurisprudence of the WTO, which narrowed the
protections of BITs for the host state in crisis by imposing a demanding test for
necessity.142 According to some scholars, such a solution “hamper[s] the ability
of governments to balance creditor demands and regulatory objectives.”143
136

Id. at 430.
Id. at 438–41.
138
See El Paso Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award,
¶¶ 614–15 (Oct. 31, 2011) (holding that stability established by a BIT cannot be total, “especially when extraordinary circumstances appear”). See generally Giorgio Sacerdoti, The Application of BITs in Time of Economic Crisis: Limits to Their Coverage, Necessity and the
Relevance of WTO Law, in GENERAL INTERESTS OF HOST STATES IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW (Giorgio Sacerdoti et al. eds., 2014). Measures taken in times of economic
crises can affect foreign investors in particular and disproportionately, especially when governments make dramatic structural changes to their economy to reinforce domestic industries.
Id. at 1, 6.
139
See Sacerdoti, supra note 138, at 14–19; Stephen Kim Park & Tim R. Samples, Tribunalizing Sovereign Debt: Argentina’s Experience with Investor–State Dispute Settlement, 50
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1033, 1054–58 (2017).
140
For a succinct reporting of this history, see Sacerdoti, supra note 138, at 14–19.
141
Id. at 14–15.
142
Id. at 17–18.
143
Park & Samples, supra note 139, at 1062. Park and Samples also noted that these arbitrations opened “a new frontier in the already fragmented global sovereign debt market . . .
presenting new challenges to sovereign autonomy in the global financial system.” Id. The panels’ interpretations of the Argentine BITs are comparable to the challenges facing India before
137
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However, panels have been inconsistent and unclear when interpreting the necessity standard.144 Practically, then, “this defense is difficult to invoke except in
the most exceptional and desperate circumstances.”145
Argentina in those proceedings did not invoke—or at least the panels did not
review—an “essential security” argument that others may seek to invoke to effect a more protectionist trade and investment policy or to skirt unfavorable BIT
requirements. In 2019, though, a WTO panel addressed the interpretation of the
GATT national security exception in its Russia—Traffic in Transit report.146
Some ISDS arbitral panels had already incorporated existing WTO jurisprudence
regarding emergency measures and essential security exceptions into their BIT
jurisprudence.147 The WTO panel held that the national security exception found
in GATT article XXI was narrower than previously thought and invoked.148 Because ISDS tribunals had already adopted the WTO necessity jurisprudence and
because of international law’s policy goal of interpreting treaties to conform with
other standards of international law, investment dispute tribunals may adopt this
new standard of necessity.149 However, imposing this WTO jurisprudence
wholesale into the BIT context would not fully take into account the policy implications that the parties to BITs had.150
C. MFN Provisions
The application of the Most-Favored Nation (MFN) provisions to ISDS generates significant uncertainty in the efficacy of BITs negotiated in the late-2010s.
MFN provisions date to the beginnings of international law and international
commercial agreements.151 They assure that one contracting state party receives
the most favorable tariff rates and any other trade benefits granted by the other

it reexamined its BIT program to invoke more severe restrictions on international arbitration.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
144
See Sacerdoti, supra note 138, at 19.
145
Id.
146
See Panel Report, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶ 7.20, WTO Doc.
WT/DS512/7 (adopted Apr. 26, 2019).
147
See, e.g., Continental Casualty v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9,
Award, ¶ 194 (Sep. 5, 2008) (citing Report of the Panel, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports
of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 7.104, WTO Doc. WT/DS332/R (adopted June 12, 2007)).
148
Russia—Traffic in Transit, supra note 146, ¶ 7.33 (interpreting the national security
exception to the GATT as requiring an objective crisis in international affairs).
149
See Sacerdoti, supra note 138, at 19–23.
150
Id. at 22–23.
151
See generally S. Hornbeck, The Most-Favored-Nation Clause, 3(4) AM. J. INT’L L. 797
(1909).
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party to any other state.152 In the context of international trade law, the GATT’s
MFN provision multilateralizes trade benefits without necessitating individual
negotiations among contracting parties.153
States adopted MFN provisions in the realm of international investment law
to augment substantive provisions granting preferential investment allowances.154 However, some litigants have attempted to secure procedural benefits
through MFN provisions by bypassing exhaustion requirements through the incorporation of more liberal forum choice provisions in other BITs.
The first arbitration panel to endorse the view that MFN provisions covered
dispute resolution procedures was Maffezini v. Spain.155 There, Emilio Agustín
Maffezini, an Argentine national, submitted a request for arbitration to the arbitral tribunal against the Kingdom of Spain without complying with exhaustion
requirements in the Argentina-Spain BIT.156 Rather, Maffezini argued that he
had the right to access international arbitration under the Chile-Spain BIT, incorporated through the MFN provision of the Argentina-Spain BIT.157 Spain counterargued that dispute resolution procedures fell outside of the purview of the
MFN clause because the dispute resolution provisions were not core substantive
provisions.158 The tribunal concluded that dispute settlement procedures were
“inextricably related to the protection of foreign investors” and “were essential
for the adequate protection of the rights they sought to guarantee.”159 The

152

See id. at 797.
See GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 58 (6th ed. 1994).
But see GILBERT R. WINHAM, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 107–
31 (1992) (offering an early criticism of MFN provisions in the context of GATT trade negotiations because of the rising importance of regional and strategic preferential trade agreements
under GATT art. XXIV).
154
Berschader v. Russian Fed’n, SCC Case No. 080/2004, Award of Apr. 21, 2006, ¶ 179
(Arbitration Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce) (declaring that “it is universally
agreed that the very essence of an MFN provision in a BIT is to afford investors all material
protection provided by subsequent treaties”). An interesting debate in this realm regards to
what extent these individual clauses incorporate the history and customary international law
of MFN provisions. Compare Zachary Douglas, The MFN Clause in Investment Arbitration:
Treaty Interpretation Off the Rails, 2(1) J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 97, 99–101, 108–13 (2011)
(arguing that States considered the customary significance of the MFN terms of art), with
Stephanie L. Parker, A BIT at a Time: The Proper Extension of the MFN Clause to Dispute
Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 2 ARB. BRIEF 30, 43–44 (2012) (arguing that under the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties the primary means of interpreting
treaties is a textual ordinary meaning in light of object and purpose reading).
155
Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the
Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (Jan. 25, 2000).
156
Id. ¶ 26 (“Claimant admits that the dispute was not referred to a Spanish court prior to
its submission to the Centre.”).
157
Id. ¶¶ 38–40.
158
Id. ¶ 40.
159
Id. ¶ 54.
153
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Maffezini panel decision on jurisdiction leads a line of reason that has been followed by other arbitral panels.160
The leading panel decision in opposition to Maffezini is Tecmed v. Mexico.161
There, the panel declined to follow the reasoning of the Maffezini panel where
the claimant asked the panel to allow a claim through the applicable BIT’s MFN
clause.162 The panel considered the dispute resolution provisions negotiated by
the parties to the operative BIT to be substantive in nature and reflect key policy
choices by the negotiating state parties.163 The reasoning of the Tecmed panel
has been adopted by a minority of panels in a line of cases rejecting the Maffezini
holding that would incorporate provisions of other BITs through MFN clauses.164
The holding of the Maffezini panel and subsequent panels in its line of reasoning is consistent with the view that the RLR is procedural in its nature.165 The
Maffezini panel did not delve into a policy discussion on Spain’s sovereign interest as Spain invited it to, but the panel did weigh heavily policy equities that
favored the claimant.166 Likewise, the procedural theory of the RLR is more
likely to be “influenced and . . . modified by the consideration of interests other

160
See, e.g., Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision
on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 103, 109 (Aug. 3, 2004) (following the Maffezini panel in applying the
MFN clause to dispute resolution procedures, finding that any public policy considerations in
favor of a stronger Rule of Local Remedies were inapplicable); Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award, ¶ 108 (June 21, 2011) (noting there has been
“near-unanimity in finding that the [MFN] clause covered the dispute settlement rules” in
cases where the clause referred to “‘all matters’ or ‘any matter’ regulated in the BIT”); see
also Andreas R. Ziegler, Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Treatment, in STANDARDS OF
INVESTMENT PROTECTION 67–74 (August Reinsisch ed., 2008) (tracing the history of these
arbitration panels considering the MFN implications to procedural qualities).
161
Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. FILJ 158 (2004).
162
Id. ¶ 69.
163
Id.
164
See, e.g., Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/14, Award, ¶ 172 (Dec. 8, 2008) (“The requirement of [recourse to local courts] can
only be dispensed with by some ‘legitimate’ extension of rights and benefits by means of the
operation of the (MFN) Clause – that is to say when the text of the MFN clause . . . permits
the interpreter of the treaty to conclude that this was the clear and unambiguous intention of
the Contracting Parties.”); ICS Inspection and Control Services (United Kingdom) v. Republic
of Argentina, PCA Case No. 2010-9, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 263–82 (Feb. 10, 2012),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0416.pdf (finding that there was
no compelling reason to disregard the restrictions of jurisdiction of the international arbitration
tribunal made by the contracting parties to the BIT). Adherents to this analytical framework
include dissenting opinions in the Maffezini line of cases. See, e.g., Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Professor
Brigitte Stern (June 21, 2011).
165
AMERASINGHE, supra note 29, at 416.
166
Maffezini, supra note 155, at ¶¶ 54–56.
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than those of the host or respondent state.”167 Consistent with the acceptance of
the RLR as a procedural requirement, the Maffezini line of reasoning with respect
to the application of MFN clauses to procedural rights is the majority view
among investor-state dispute settlement arbitration panels.168 In contrast, the line
of reasoning endorsed by the Tecmed panel supports broadly the substantive theory of the RLR. The substantive theory of the RLR values the state’s sovereignty
interest above any other policy equity.169 The policies considered by the Tecmed
panel reflect this preference for enforcement of the state’s sovereignty interest in
the choice of forum clause.170
This division in the authority from the investment tribunals generates uncertainty among the BITs negotiated in the late-2010s, which in many ways responded to this division in authority. Some of the BITs negotiated in the late2010s have specific carve-outs within their MFN provisions to attempt to foreclose a panel applying the Maffezini line of reasoning.171 Even in the face of a
strong textual imperative, a panel holding to the procedural theory of the RLR
will likely be inclined to find a waiver or exception to the RLR in favor of a
claimant, weighing the policy interests of the claimant over the policy interests
of the state.
D. “X-Factors”—Non-Traditional or Non-Legal Frustrations of BITs
The use of non-traditional or non-legal means to gain an advantage or pursue
other interests present the most unpredictable limitation upon the international
investment system grounded in BITs. Such “x-factors” can have a chilling effect
upon the foreign investor or dramatically raise transaction costs for either making
and managing investments or vindicating the rights of both the foreign investor
and the host state.
One such “x-factor” is the invocation of local or third-party courts after an
arbitral award to frustrate the enforcement of ISDS awards. A well-known example of this tactic is the saga of BG Group, PLC’s arbitration against the Republic of Argentina under the Argentina-UK BIT.172 Following Argentina’s 2001
167

AMERASINGHE, supra note 29, at 13.
See RUBINS ET AL., supra note 39, at 262–63 (recognizing ambiguity in the authorities
regarding whether an MFN provision applies to procedural rights but supporting Maffezini as
representing the majority rule).
169
Id. at 397.
170
Tecmed, supra note 161, ¶ 69.
171
E.g. Indonesia-Australia BIT, supra note 110, at art. 14.5(3) (“For greater certainty, the
[MFN clause] shall not encompass international dispute resolution procedures . . . .”).
172
See Arturo C. Porzecanski, The Origins of Argentina’s Litigation and Arbitration Saga,
2002-2016, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 41 (2016) (giving an extensive history of the scope of the
legal challenges Argentina faced between 2002 and 2016).
168
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economic crisis and its default on its sovereign debt, BG Group initiated international arbitration proceedings against the Republic of Argentina on April 25,
2003.173 The arbitration panel convened in 2004 in Washington, D.C. and New
York, and held proceedings through 2006, with a unanimous panel ruling in BG
Group’s favor on December 24, 2007.174 As part of its legal conclusions, the
arbitration panel concluded that BG Group could bypass the requirement to exhaust local remedies, rejecting Argentina’s reliance on its state of emergency to
exonerate it from liability.175 On March 21, 2008, Argentina filed a petition to
vacate or modify the arbitration award in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia, claiming a right to relief under the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”).176 On June 7, 2010, the D.C. District Court issued a ruling in BG
Group’s favor, finding that the arbitration award did not present any issue that
the court could adjudicate under the FAA.177 On January 27, 2012, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that the courts could review the
arbitration award’s discussion of jurisdiction de novo because the parties had not
consented to the jurisdiction of the arbitrators.178 The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately reversed on March 5, 2014, finding the arbitrators’ determinations lawful.179
While U.S. court system ultimately affirmed the arbitration panel’s decision,
Argentina’s litigation frustrated the outcome of the arbitration for six and a half
years beyond the panel’s award judgement. BG Group’s litigation, initiated in
April 2003 and concluded March 2014, is not an outlier in international arbitration jurisprudence. Argentina’s “rogue behavior” in its attempts to frustrate the
ISDS system and other mechanisms of international economic law no longer
seem out of the ordinary.180 In addition, while the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision

173

Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp. PLC, 715 F.Supp.2d 108, 114 (D.D.C. 2010).
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 112, 114.
177
Id. at 126. The D.C. District Court accepted that it had the power to review the arbitral
award under the U.S. Congress’s authorization of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, but quoted the rule that “a court must confirm an arbitration award where some colorable support for the award can be gleaned from the
record.” Id. at 116.
178
Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp. PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1370, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
179
BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Arg., 572 U.S. 25, 45 (2014).
180
Compare Porzecanski, supra note 172, at 68–77 (documenting how Argentina departed
from international economic “best practices” through “emergency measures” and litigation
strategies), with Editorial Board, Two Bills to Defend Free Trade: Congressional Action to
Rein in Presidential Tarriff Power is Overdue, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2019, 7:31 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/two-bills-to-defend-free-trade-11549585914
(conservativeleaning editorial staff arguing that Congress should rein in the U.S President’s unilateral tariff
authority in light of unpredictable behavior), and Editorial Board, The National Security Tariff
Ruse: Commerce Relies on Bad Data and Can’t Even Persuade the Pentagon, WALL ST. J.
174
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would seem to bolster the finality of the decisions of international arbitration
bodies, parties seeking to avoid the effects of arbitral awards often invoke U.S.
domestic courts to attack awards.181
Diplomacy can also frustrate the BIT system and international trade and investment generally. While some BITs place emphasis on some peaceful or diplomatic dispute resolution, the ad hoc negotiations that occurred in the United
States-China negotiations in the late-2010s lacked an adequate resolution framework, and an abundance of distrust strained negotiations and relationships.182
Further, those negotiations struggled to gather the support of the U.S. business
community, which then-U.S. President Trump viewed as essential to the success
of the negotiations.183 This diplomatic space, though, can offer many benefits to
the states by increased control over the dispute and dispute resolution process.
To take advantage of such potential benefits, states must understand their role in
ISDS and the BIT regime.
Under the international investment treaty framework, States are inherently
both parties and respondents to actions brought under them. Thus, BITs and the
ISDS process are neither purely public international law nor private commercial
agreements and arbitration. If BITs are purely public international law, treaty
parties can, at any time, undermine not only investors’ expectation but also tribunals’ dispute resolution powers.184 However, if considered purely private
(Mar. 12, 2018, 7:28 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-national-security-tariff-ruse1520897310 (arguing U.S. President’s unilateral trade actions constitute executive overreach).
181
E.g., Hardy Expl. & Prod. (India) v. Gov’t of India, Ministry of Petroleum & Nat. Gas,
314 F. Supp. 3d 95 (D.D.C. 2018).
182
See Rachel Brown & Preston Lim, SinoTech: U.S. and China Delay Bilateral Summit
as Negotiators Work on Trade Deal, LAWFARE: HARD NAT’L SEC. CHOICES (Mar. 20, 2019,
2:13 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/sinotech-us-and-china-delay-bilateral-summit-negotiators-work-trade-deal (exploring the twists and turns of that week’s negotiation progress as
the United States maintained the threat of tariffs while insisting on further concessions from
China).
183
See Jeff Stein et al., Trump Retaliates in Trade War by Escalating Tariffs on Chinese
Imports and Demanding Companies Cut Ties with China, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2019, 7:10
PM) (quoting an August 23, 2019 Tweet from Trump’s currently-suspended account which
“order[ed] all carriers” to diminish trade and investment in China); cf. Scott Moore, Trump’s
Techno-Nationalism, LAWFARE: HARD NAT’L SEC. CHOICES (Aug. 15, 2019, 8:00 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/trumps-techno-nationalism (arguing that it is against the interests of the U.S. business community to participate in strong-arm negotiations that the Trump
Administration demands). Interests within the business community that run against the interests of diplomats and general disinterest among the business community with liberalizing trade
negotiations have been cited as bearing at least partial responsibility for the failure of the Doha
Round of WTO negotiations among the academic community. See supra notes 14–18 and
accompanying text.
184
Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual
Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 183 (2010) (“If the treaty parties could agree at any
time on a binding interpretation of the treaty, they could use that authority to undermine not
only investors’ expectations but also tribunals’ dispute resolution powers.”).
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arbitrations, dispute settlement mechanisms can “assert and establish new legal
norms, often in unintended ways.”185 Although states largely delegated interpretive power over BITs to international tribunals, the states also attempted to retain
and exercise this power—to disparate ends.186 One commentator argued that
states and parties should engage in an interpretive dialogue on the interpretation
of treaties within the international investment arbitration regime.187 The limitations of this approach stem from the reality that few BITs include the textual
mechanisms by which parties may express an opinion on the interpretation of the
BITs before or during ISDS arbitration.188 However, as international investment
law evolves, dissatisfied states may demand greater influence in the ISDS system.189 Thus, as states increase their power in the international investment system, states and investors will likely resort to diplomatic approaches to resolution
and a dialogue approach to the interpretation of these BITs.

V.

CONCLUSION

By the beginning of the 2020s, many states had renegotiated BITs and as part
of the global reorientation of international trade and investment law and the return of economic protectionism as a legitimate policy interest. Specifically in the
BITs negotiated in the late-2010s, states attempted to reimpose the RLR and claw
back liberal grants of arbitral authority to the ISDS system. These steps were a
reaction to the abuse of ISDS by investors at the beginning of the twenty-first
century and the perceived encroachment on state sovereignty interests by the arbitral panels. Where BIT negotiations in the wake of the Uruguay Round and
founding of the WTO stressed the liberalization and globalization of the international economy,190 states negotiating BITs in the late-2010s were more conscious
of the potential shortfalls of BITs and ISDS.
As evidenced by the sampling of BITs studied in this Note, the policy equities
considered by the states negotiating these BITs led to a more confusing framework. For example, an investor from the UAE has startling different rights in a
dispute depending on whether the investment is in Hong Kong, Japan, Mali,

185

Id. at 184 (quoting Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT’L ORG. 457, 459 (2000)).
186
Id. at 180–81 (describing the NAFTA parties’ attempt to assert power over the interpretation of NAFTA through the FTC statement of July 31, 2000).
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188
Id. at 216.
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Uruguay, or Brazil.191 The continued failure to conclude a multilateral treaty governing (or at least setting a framework for) the international investment regime
has resulted in a system that undermines the system’s goals of encouraging FDI.
Especially within treaty frameworks such as those of Brazil or India, investors
may lose confidence in the state and its commitment to cooperation in the preservation and promotion of FDI. Without a robust procedure for the protection of
the investors’ expectations, there is a significant opportunity for opportunistic
behavior by state actors after FDI is made. Thus, investors will have to factor in
this potential for opportunistic behavior into their economic calculations when
deciding to engage in FDI.
Of course, international tribunals and other forms of ISDS could import additional protections to investors and FDI through customary international law doctrines such as the FET standard192 or through MFN clauses. Tribunals also may
be less willing to accept the imposition of the RLR in these BITs or more willing
to find customary exceptions to the RLR. In the majority theory of the RLR, the
RLR is merely procedural and may be waived under customary international law
through a balancing test that weighs the sovereignty interest of the host country
against the fairness and reliance of the foreign claimant.193 Implicit in the ISDS
forum choice clauses of many of the BITs discussed in this Note is a policy favoring the sovereignty interests of the host state. They in effect ask tribunals to
accept the substantive view of the RLR—the minority view.194 This could lead
to a frustration of the interests behind BITs that favor the interests of the host
state’s sovereignty.
Ultimately, though, it is the further erosion of the investors’ reliance that is the
greatest shortcomings of the BITs negotiated in the late-2010s. While intrinsic
bias in the BIT system and abuse by investor-litigants in the ISDS system revealed the issues in the international investment system at the beginning of the
twenty-first century, the swing in economic policy towards protectionism that is
inherent in many BITs negotiated in the late-2010s is to the detriment of FDI.
As explored in this Note, both investors and states have tactics and strategies to
frustrate the FDI system without protectionist treaties through doctrines such as
national security and emergency as well as litigation games and old-fashioned
191

See Hong Kong–UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 8(5) (liberal grant of arbitral jurisdiction); Japan–UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 17(5)(a) (limited grant of arbitral jurisdiction);
Mali–UAE BIT, supra note 110, at art. 11(3) (limited grant of arbitral jurisdiction); UAE–
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diplomacy. The restrictions to the procedural protections made in many BITs
negotiated in the late-2010s are not necessary for the ends they seek. Contemporaneously to some of those BITs negotiations, trade commentators feared that
they would stem the flow of FDI.195 The BITs that place extreme limitations upon
the procedural rights of the foreign investors are unfavorable because of the detrimental impact they will have on the foreign investors’ reliance interests and
unwise because of the other doctrines of international law that will serve to frustrate them.

195

See supra notes 126–31 and accompanying text.

